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1 Abstract	  
In most covert channel systems, bandwidth is sacrificed for covertness. By using a dynamic, 
broad spectrum approach it was possible to use multiple covert channels to create a larger 
pipeline for data transmission. This approach utilized a monitor to determine how much data the 
network would be able to support before suspicion would be drawn to the change in traffic 
utility. The system then dispersed this traffic to each protocol proportionately using their 
monitored utility as a guide. A feedback channel was also utilized to determine if channel 
transmissions were successful and disabled any channels for future use that the network security 
blocked. In this way, a robust channel system was created that also increased bandwidth of 
communication. 
2 Introduction	  
Covert channels were first proposed by Lampson (Lampson, 1973) to solve the Prisoners’ 
Problem (Simmons, 1983). In the Prisoners’ Problem, two parties wished to communicate with 
each other, however all communication travels through a third party, the warden. The prisoners 
wanted to communicate messages in a way that the warden would not be able to interpret. To do 
this, they must hide their secret communications within the overt messages the warden has the 
ability to see. This ability to hide the second level of communication is the purpose of covert 
channels. 
 
Lampson stated that the purpose of a covert channel was to circumvent security policies. The 
most common way is to use resources in an unusual way. Examples of this are regulating 
processor utility or altering network packet header information in fields that are not checked. 
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Even though these are not designed to transfer information, they can be leveraged to carry out 
malicious activity. In this way it is possible to hide that communication is taking place. 
2.1 Purpose	  of	  Covert	  Channels	  
Unlike cryptography, covert channels are used to hide the fact that any communication is taking 
place (Zander, Armitage, & Branch, 2007). Since covert channels attempt to conceal end points, 
it is harder to connect that the parties are communicating. In some cases, the fact that two parties 
are communicating with cryptography can raise suspicion and provoke further investigation 
(Newman, 2007).  If cryptology is in use, it is showing that the parties want to hide what they are 
saying.  An unencrypted channel would not draw as much attention since it would not appear 
that there is something to hide. 
2.2 Bandwidth	  vs.	  Covertness	  
Covert channels have the inherent problem of sacrificing bandwidth for covertness (Cabuk, 
Brodley, & Shields, IP Covert Timing Channels: Design and Detection, 2004) (Cabuk, Brodley, 
& Shields, IP Covert Channel Detection, 2009) (Moskowitz, Chang, & Newman, 2002). For this 
reason, the two must be balanced. If one wanted to increase the bandwidth of a channel, they 
could send a big block of plain text, but this would not be covert. Conversely, the most covert a 
transmission could be is not sending any information at all which would be an unacceptable level 
of throughput.  
2.3 Types	  of	  Covert	  Channels	  
There are three types of covert channels: storage, timing, and behavior.  Storage channels utilize 
some form of medium where one party has permission to write and another party can read 
(Cabuk, Brodley, & Shields, IP Covert Channel Detection, 2009).  This type of channel has the 
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ability to be non-real time, the parties do not need to be actively connected for successful 
transmission.  Eggers et. al. (Eggers & Mallett, 1988) also identifies that covert channels which 
utilize network protocols are a type of storage channel. This type of channel will be used in this 
paper. 
 
Timing channels utilize patterns based on clocks (Cabuk, Brodley, & Shields, IP Covert Timing 
Channels: Design and Detection, 2004).  These can be slightly more secure since they require 
active monitoring to detect the channel since patterns may be difficult to notice.  They have the 
disadvantage of the two parties needing their clocks to be synchronized. 
 
The last type of channel is based on behavior.  In these, messages are sent by one party acting in 
a certain way and the action is interpreted based on a predetermined alphabet (Johnson, Yuan, & 
Lutz, 2009).  These are harder to detect because actions need to be analyzed to determine if they 
fit the normal behavior of the party. If there is deviation, it then needs to be determined whether 
that deviation was intended or random change.  The difficulty is selecting an appropriate 
alphabet to use to be able to maintain an acceptable bandwidth while maintaining normal 
behavior. 
2.4 Proposed	  Idea	  
The dynamic, broad spectrum covert channel system incorporates many covert channels working 
together as one. The main property of covert channels is that an increase of bandwidth means a 
decrease of covertness. Depending on the desired utility of the channel, low bandwidth can be 
problematic. In traditional thought, covertness would be sacrificed to increase the bandwidth and 
vise versa, but this paper proposes a covert channel system that maintains appropriate covertness 
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while increasing bandwidth.  This will provide a higher capability as defined by Moskowitz, et. 
al., that detection is taking into account with bandwidth when analyzing covert channels 
(Moskowitz, Chang, & Newman, 2002). 
 
Much work has been done to create covert channels in many different protocols (Khan, Javed, 
Mirza, & Khayam, 2009) and to optimize their covertness and bandwidth. By using many of 
these channels together this covert channel system could be covert while maintaining a higher 
bandwidth. 
 
One way of increasing bandwidth would be to push the covert channels more frequently. Even if 
a covert channel is used with an existing service, it could still be possible to over-saturate the 
network with channel traffic to the point of suspicion. A single protocol covert channel under 
control would not increase usage enough to be noticeable. But to increase the bandwidth by 
pushing it more would raise suspicion. 
 
If multiple channels are used together, each on different protocols, it would be possible to 
increase the load of all the protocols together to keep the traffic proportions similar to the 
network fingerprint. This method would effectively hide the covet traffic in itself. 
3 Related	  Work	  
"Towards Adaptive Covert Communication Systems" (Yarochkin, Dai, Lin, Huang, & Kuo, 
2008) proposed a similar solution of monitoring and adapting to the specific network, however 
their approach focused on creating a robust channel. The channel would start by monitoring the 
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network to determine the type of traffic being used. It then ranked the channels it was bundled 
with to determine what would be the optimal choice, the one that would be least likely detected 
on the monitored network. A feedback mechanism was in place to make sure the channel was 
successfully passing through to its endpoint. If the feedback showed that the channel was broken, 
it would select the next optimal channel. In this way, the channel remained robust under active 
wardens that might block some channels. The proposed channel performed similarly for the 
training and channel selection although it selected multiple channels to use together. This paper 
focused on increasing bandwidth where theirs was to increase robustness.  
 
"Embedding a Covert Channel in Active Network Connections" also used multiple protocols, but 
in a different way. Unlike the previous channel, Khan et. al. used preexisting connections for its 
transfer instead of generating new traffic (Khan, Javed, Mirza, & Khayam, 2009). Most timing 
channels rely on the timed difference of arrivals of packets, this channel used the pattern of 
packets. This solved the problem of networks that fluctuate in speed over time. The two parts of 
the channel are the sender, which controlled the network connections of a computer system and 
the receiver, which monitored the incoming connections and detected the pattern. This improved 
typical timing channels by taking away the problem of unsynchronized timing. Since it used 
multiple protocols, normal timing detection techniques would be harder because not all the 
protocols needed to be used meaning a set theory is required to detect the channel. Similar to this 
channel, the proposed channel needed to synchronize the pattern, but the proposed system used 
storage mechanisms for message transfer as opposed to strictly the pattern. The pattern used in 
the proposed system related to how the message was broken down to get distributed across the 
channels. 
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"Capacity is the Wrong Paradigm" (Moskowitz, Chang, & Newman, 2002) stated that the metric 
so many rely on to measure covert channels (in their case steganographic channels) is capacity, 
but they propose that it should be capability. They differentiate covert and steganographic 
channels in that stegonagraphy has a finite transmission time and that they only exist when they 
are hidden. One of the factors in the capability measurement is capacity, but it also includes 
detectability and robustness of the channel. Normal communication has a capacity whose limit is 
the amount of information that can be transferred error-free. This is important in covert 
communication in general, it doesn’t matter how much information a channel can carry if it is 
easily detected or breaks down with the smallest noise. That is why multiple vectors were used, 
each being covert with capability, but working together to generate a higher throughput for better 
capacity.  
4 Dynamic,	  Broad	  Spectrum	  Approach	  
4.1 Problem	  it	  Solves	  
In a real world network, there will be a specific baseline of traffic usage that is unknown from 
the outside environment. When adding a covert channel, it is difficult to determine how much 
traffic can be added before it would become noticeable. For example, if there was a significant 
increase in traffic usage, such as DNS using 25% of traffic when the baseline is only 2.5%. It 
would also be suspicious if an unused protocol randomly appeared on a network that did not 
previously use that protocol. 
 
 
Christopher Hoffman  7 
There are multiple types of covert recognizers in practice, such as protocol analyzers to make 
sure that header information is legitimate since this is a common place to hide information in 
network traffic. Another recognizer could log traffic to see if there is a detectable pattern that 
could be a timing channel.  This paper is based on a different detection mechanism that uses 
service utility to detect possible covert channels.  This work is concerned that adding traffic will 
cause a spike in usage of a service which will signal possible malicious behavior in the network 
and provoke investigation. 
 
The network monitor works off the theory that in a network, traffic proportions will stay largely 
similar. As total usage increases, the utility of each protocol increases proportionally to the 
baseline as opposed to only one or two protocols increasing in usage.  
 
Two possible problems a covert channel could face in a network are over saturation and 
operation on an unused protocol.  An outside observer does not know how much traffic is being 
used inside a network.  They could access the network, configure a monitor, come back at a later 
point in time, and configure a covert channel to use what was present.  This would require the 
attacker gain access to the network a few times to carry out all the operations and additional 
times if the channel does not work the first time.  It would be much easier if a single application 
could carry out the operations and possibly safer since the attacker does not need to keep 
entering. 
 
A system assisted by a monitor could help protect the covert channel system against both of 
these issues.  By monitoring how much services get used in the network, it would be possible to 
 
Christopher Hoffman  8 
calculate how much data can be added by the system before it became noticeable.  A channel 
could provide a large bandwidth if it transmitted continuously as fast as it could but would be 
noticeable.  It must be throttled to where its usage would not trigger the alarm.  The monitor is 
the solution for this. 
 
The monitor would also assist in knowing what protocols the network was using.  If an attacker 
took a look at the network during the day and configured an HTTP channel to run continuously 
at an acceptable level from the small window observed, it could be possible once employees 
leave for the day that HTTP usage goes down and the channel would stand out.  Conversely, if 
an attacker looks at night they might miss a wealth of HTTP traffic to hide in during the day. 
 
The network landscape will continually be changing and the covert channel system must be able 
to handle this change or the chance of detection will increase. 
 
The other problem faced by covert channels is that they are low bandwidth.  Since this cannot be 
solved by pushing the channel more with one pipe as shown in Figure 1, this thesis proposes 
using a group of small pipes that together will increase bandwidth such as in Figure 2.  Using 
more than one channel will help solve the bandwidth problem as well as the network usage 
problem.  If multiple services raise their usage (packets/hour), it might be possible to protect 
their proportionate network usage (%).  This would effectively hide the channel in itself while 
increasing its bandwidth. 
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Figure 1: Single channel system 
 
Figure 2:  Multiple channel system 
To note, this monitoring approach is only related to network traffic IDS as defined above.  A 
host based IDS will be able to detect the increase of network traffic from the computer it is on 
and trigger alerts.  The purpose of this experiment is to avoid detection by modeling a broad 
spectrum channel based on monitored network statistics. 
4.2 Monitor	  Network	  
To increase the covertness of the communication, the system first monitored the network it was 
on to detect normal network usage and to pair the communication scheme with the network 
fingerprint. The system will only be successful once the capability of the environment has been 
discovered as stated by Cabuk et. al. (Cabuk, Brodley, & Shields, IP Covert Timing Channels: 
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Design and Detection, 2004).  Each network will have a different fingerprint from IP ranges, 
servers, protocols used, topology, and most importantly security. A covert channel can be 
optimized to hide information deep inside a protocol, but it will be unsuccessful if its usage 
patterns do not match the network's, triggering a security alert to the presence of the channel. If a 
certain service does not get used or gets used rarely in the network, the covert channel on that 
protocol would stand out. 
 
This information gets stored for later use deciding which covert channels to use and how much 
traffic can be added to each protocol before becoming significant.  The intricate information that 
could be discovered inside the network made this covert channel system more dangerous than if 
an attacker only monitored from the outside (Bertino & Ghinita, 2011). 
4.3 Channel	  and	  Bandwidth	  Selection 
To determine the amount of traffic the system is able to add to the network, statistical analysis 
was used.  Using the standard deviation of the network from the monitoring phase and a 
predetermined t-value, the t-test equation was used to calculate the greatest amount of traffic that 
can be added before it became significant. 
 
Once the system knew how much total traffic was available and the proportions of that traffic, 
the channels can be selected. Since this is based off ingress and egress traffic, an appropriate 
channel should be chosen which matches the ingress to egress ratio of the added traffic. By 
matching these statistics the greatest amount of added traffic can be utilized. 
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4.4 Data	  Communication	  
To help with the covertness of the channel, the message was broken up between all the channels. 
If a single channel contains consecutive message pieces in a row, the discovery of the channel 
would have a readable message and might be interpreted as a communication. A readable 
message would raise suspicion where a broken message would look more random and therefore 
less suspicious. 
 
A timed window was used to determine that the channel was working properly for checking but 
this is not a timing channel. The clocks do not need to be exactly the same as long as they are 
relatively synchronized. Also, there is no definite pattern that is followed, it will change based on 
the network usage during that time period. The chosen time window is an hour for each data 
segment. 
4.5 Danger	  of	  Channel	  System	  
"Capacity of Steganographic Channels" (Harmsen & Pearlmean, 2005) discuss that a covert 
channel is only successful if it arrives at the destination undetected in an understandable format.  
This covert channel system faces problems meeting both of these requirements.  By having more 
than one covert channel being run at the same time, the chance of discovery increases.  There is 
also a danger of the control message encountering a problem in transit which could cause the 
covert message to be misinterpreted.  If either of these things happened the channel would fail 
for the current time window and would have to restart during the next. 
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4.6 Channel	  Detection	  Mechanism	  
The network had baseline statistics to match against. When the covert system was run, it 
monitored the statistics. Once the time frame was over, it ran a statistical t-test on the data to 
determine if there was a significant increase in usage. Total traffic could also be checked, but a 
significant increase does not mean there is a problem, it could be due to adding or removing a 
user in the network.  Since the amount of traffic will be added proportionately to each protocol in 
use, there would not be any spikes to alert a network administrator to a problem point. 
 
If one of the protocols was found to be significant, either from being used more by the channel or 
lowing usage by not being used, the channel system can be discovered.  If a single channel is 
discovered, network security could be changed to block it, leaving the rest of the system 
untouched.  As more channels are discovered, the whole system has a higher chance of being 
discovered. 
5 Structure	  of	  the	  System	  
There are three main parts to the covert channel system: an initial monitoring system, an internal 
controller, and an external controller. 
 
For this demonstration, the channels themselves were not important. Since other covert channel 
recognizers were not in place, there would not be added value to have real channels as long as 
they transmitted at a similar capacity. The ‘channels’ transferred on a service protocol channel 
and sent only a few bytes at a time as a typical covert channel would behave.  
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5.1 Test	  Environment	  
The testing environment was made up of two networks in a virtual environment, 192.168.1.0 
being the attacked network and 192.168.2.0 being the network data was being sent to.  Each of 
these had a DNS server, mail server, ftp server, ssh server, two clients, and a router to connect to 
the Internet.  Another router connected the two network routers in the 192.168.0.0 network and 
forwarded traffic between the two test networks.  The network topology is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Client machines were equipped with user scripts to simulate network traffic.  This traffic was a 
necessity while testing since the system needed to monitor the current state of the network to 
decide how the system should perform. The traffic influences what channels and how much of 
each channel will get used.  The traffic was also necessary while testing to make sure the system 
worked as expected in a real network and didn’t trigger any alarms in the data transfer. 
 
The user scripts were run at random intervals around a base to attempt to match the proportions 
found in the DARPA 98 dataset. 
 
 
Christopher Hoffman  14 
 
Figure 3: Network topology for test environment 
5.2 Learning	  Engine	  
The monitor was designed to run passively for a week before data transfer to determine usage 
statistics. To determine usage statistics for the hour quicker, detection was made of four 15 
minute segments. It would be safer to gather statistics over the course of a couple weeks, but 
there was a balance of safety vs data transfer. 
 
The monitor used the tshark command line utility to capture traffic in 15 minute intervals.  
Tshark display options were used to pick out only necessary data fields which could get piped 
into the Java monitor program.  The passed fields were source IP, source port, destination IP, 
destination port, and the IP protocol.  This removed the need for Java to parse the network packet 
itself. 
 
The Java program needed to have the network address and subnet mask to determine whether 
traffic was ingress or egress based on the addresses match to the given network information.  The 
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ports on the addresses were used to determine what protocol the traffic was.  The data was kept 
in a Map until the end of the time frame at which point it was moved to storage. 
 
The data was stored in a JSON data file for easy storage and recall between iterations of the 
system.  At the end of the hour, the mean and standard deviations were calculated and also stored 
into the JSON file. 
5.3 Channel	  Selection	  
For the purposes of testing, actual channels did not need to be chosen. The purpose of this 
process was the learning and scheme processing that would  raise usage statistics uniformly. For 
this reason, specific channels were not chosen, each channel used was traffic on a specific 
service port which only sent a small amount of data at a time, similar to how a covert channel 
would behave. To maintain a standard between channels, each channel sent 1 byte per 
transaction.  
 
The channels were created using simple Java network connections.  Actual protocol behavior 
was observed using Wireshark protocol analyzer.  The number of ingress and egress packets 
were counted for the TCP connection including the handshakes.  The Java server/client programs 
were then generated to mimic the packet transfer behavior of real channel to send the same 
amount of packets per transaction while only sending 1 byte of data from the whole transaction 
(handshake to handshake).  This was to maintain accuracy by simulating real world behavior. 
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After the week of network monitoring and statistical analysis, the channel system got called to 
run.  The system ran in one hour windows, each time updating its schema based on the statistics 
from the monitor. 
 
The first computation was to determine how much traffic can be added to the network before it 
becomes significant.  
 
The selector started by determining how much traffic could be added to the network before it 
becomes significant. For the test, a t-value of 2.00 was used instead of 2.35 which would be the 
t-value with alpha 0.05 and df=4 (for each of the 15 minute segments).  This is similar to 
Moskowitz and Miller (Moskowitz & Miller, 1992)  protecting against a noisy network for 
timing channels.  This way, if the network went through a cycle of high usage, it had less of a 
chance to trigger an alarm.  The t-test was run with this predetermined t-value to determine the 
amount of traffic that would make the system significant. 
 
From there, each of the channels received a portion of the added traffic. Using the mean and 
additional traffic values, it determined if each protocol was significant. If any protocol was 
significant, the additional traffic was decreased by 5% and the process was attempted again until 
acceptable values were found. 
 
The system attempted to find a covert channel for each of the protocols present in the network as 
this would theoretically produce the largest throughput.  Each of the stored channels had a set 
ingress to egress traffic ratio. This ratio was used to select channels to match closely to the 
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available traffic based on the calculated ratio of ingress to egress.  The channel with the closest 
proportion was used since this utilized the most traffic available. 
 
Once the channels were selected, the network proportions were rechecked to make sure the 
network would still be able to theoretically support the additional traffic.  If a problem was 
found, it decreased the amount of allowed traffic by 5% and re-picked the channels.  This helped 
ensure the channel stayed within the safety range.  The pseudocode for this can be found in 
Figure A-1, located in Appendix A.  
5.4 Channel	  Information	  
The channels were stored as JSON objects, with the name of the channel being used as the key.  
The other information stored in the object was the channel ID, the protocol it operated on, the 
amount of data per transaction, the number of packets the channel uses in each direction, and 
whether the channel had been blocked from use. 
 
The name of the channel was used to pick the appropriate class to use as the channel 
sender/receiver.  When the controller was starting the channel, it called the class name to 
instantiate the channel. 
 
The internal connection was the client (sender) and the external had the server (receiver).  
Although the system could open server connectors on the inside, most of the well known ports 
require super user privileges to listen on. 
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The controller used the amount of data to break the message up into pieces.  The number of 
ingress and egress packets were used to help calculate the additional traffic being added to the 
network to test if a level of significance had been reached. 
 
The blocked field was used to tell the system not to use a certain channel if a problem had been 
detected with it.  This helped the system be more robust by not reusing anything that had been 
found unreliable or detected. 
5.5 Opening	  Control	  Message	  
The external controller opened all of its channel receivers to listen for the control message since 
it did not know what channel would be used for control. The internal controller generated the 
control message which consisted of ordered pairs of channel id and number of transfers. 
 
The schema needed to be transferred to the outside so it knew how to reconstruct the message. 
The transfer of the scheme outside the network took place on a single channel. The channel with 
the highest data/hour amount was chosen as the control channel. This feedback channel was also 
used at the end for the closing transactions. 
 
Since this channel would have additional usage in the process, its allocated usage for the 
message was decreased to protect it from overstepping the significance level. There was a 
timeout in place in case the first channel chosen did not work, it could move onto another 
channel, blocking the first. This continued until a successful channel was found. 
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5.6 Data	  Transfer	  
Starting the data transfer section, the first thing that was done was breaking the message apart for 
the different channels.  If a channel would get discovered and read and there is a readable 
message, it becomes much more suspicious than if the data appeared random.  This method was 
better than keeping message segments whole and using encryption (Newman, 2007). 
 
To break the data up, the channels were sorted in order by number of transactions from most to 
least.  An ArrayList was used to hold the order the message was broken into.  The List was 
populated by the largest channel first, filling in one index for every transfer with the channel ID.  
For the remainder of the channels in order, an ID was placed every other index until all the 
channels were used.  Population of the List proceeded for each progressive channel starting 
where the previous left off.  Message ordering pseudocode can be found in Figure A-2 located in 
Appendix A. 
 
Each thread took part of the message as a List of bytes.  The channel sender got called taking the 
bytes it was going to send in that transaction.  The channel kept getting called until it had sent the 
entirety of its message. 
 
A thread was created for each of the channels being used and set to run until there were 5 
minutes left in the hour.  The final 5 minutes were left for the control channel to communicate 
the closing.  Transactions were spaced equally out across the sending time period to appear more 
natural.  If there was a burst of data, there could have been raised suspicion.  See Figure A-3 for 
pseudocode in Appendix A for internal controller process. 
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Each channel thread called a channel based on the name from its object.  The name was the name 
of the channel sender class.  The sender class uses an interface made of 5 methods: run(), 
addData(ArrayList<Byte>), getData(), close(), and isSuccess().  The last was for the control 
thread to check if any of the channels were having a problem, the rest is self explanatory.  
Pseudocode for channel control can be found in Figure A-4 located in Appendix A. 
 
If at any point a channel dropped a message, the thread used a Boolean to notify the controller 
that a problem had occurred.  At this point, the controller shut down all the channels to protect 
the system.  If one channel failed, the traffic it was supposed to be adding to the network would 
not exist and could cause one of the other protocols to become significant.  By having all the 
channels shut down, control was maintained by the system. 
 
This does not negatively affect the performance of the system.  Once one message piece was 
dropped, the external controller would drop the message in the end anyway.  This way there was 
less traffic to be detected.  If the channel was blocked and the rest continued on, it could cause 
imbalance in the network.  The imbalance could cause the proportions to fall out of the baseline 
and bring more attention to the channels. 
 
While the internal controller was getting the message split and threads created, the external 
controller was getting the receivers prepared. The channel receivers worked on a similar 
interface as the sending end except it didn’t have an isSuccess() method.  The receiving end was 
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passive; it listened until the end of the time period so it didn’t need to actively check on success.  
Figure A-5 in Appendix A shows pseudocode for the external controller process.   
 
This time, only the channels requested in the control message were started.  They passively 
waited, receiving traffic as it was transmitted.  Once started, the external controller waited until 
the end of transfer period which was X:55 of the respective hour.  When this time was reached, 
the controller gathered the data from the channels and closed them. 
 
This framework could be a one-to-many configuration. During testing, all the traffic travelled to 
the central point outside the network, but it could travel to different addresses outside the 
network. This would provide some additional security to the channel since it would break up the 
connectivity of the channel. If a covert channel was discovered to a location, chances are that 
address would be monitored more closely. If different external addresses were used, it would 
make it harder to track other channels once one was discovered.  
5.7 Closing	  Control	  Message	  
Once the sending time period had finished, the closing control message started. 
 
Using the data received during the control thread, the channels were checked for completion.  
This was done by comparing the amount of data received with the number of transfers expected 
and the amount of data per transfer.  If any channels did not send the appropriate amount of data, 
the system had failed and the offending channels were blocked from further use. 
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If all transfers were deemed successful, the external controller created the same message 
mapping that was used to break the message into pieces in the internal controller.  This time it 
worked through the mapping List and takes from the appropriate channel in order. 
 
The channel that control data was received on was restarted.  This time the channel was set to 
send a message back based on the results of the channel system.  If the channel was successful, 
the message was ‘0’.  If the channel failed at any point, the message started with an ‘1’ and had 
all the channels that failed appended to the end of the message. 
 
The internal controller started the control thread used in the beginning, this time using a blank 
message.  The interaction communicated to the internal controller how the channel performed. 
 
If the first byte of the message was 0, the controller updated the index the message was at and 
saved the channel file with any blocking updates necessary.  If the first byte was an 1, then the 
index remained the same and the indexes in the rest of the message were blocked from future 
use. 
 
This was needed to ensure that this channel system remained robust. Sooner or later the system 
would become known and pieces would be secured.  By logging the blocked channels, they will 
be avoided from future use.  
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5.8 Network	  Monitor	  
The last part to be developed was to assist in testing the system.  The monitor utilized baseline 
statistics collected by the baseline monitor.  These statistics were then stored in the detector data 
directory for use during monitoring. 
 
To detect possible illicit activity, the monitor utilized a process similar to the one from the covert 
channel system, except it ran for a full hour.  At the end of the hour, it tallied the traffic to 
determine the network usage statistics.  It then preformed a t-test for each of the protocols and 
determined significance using the mean and standard deviation from the monitor and t=2.35 as 
opposed to the 2.00 used by the covert system.  If there were any protocols that were significant, 
the system threw an alert.  It would also issue an alert if there was a protocol that was present 
during the test that wasn’t during the baseline. 
6 Covert	  System	  Results 
6.1 Testing	  Procedure	  
To test, the system was run in the test environment.  The first step was to determine the baseline 
network traffic with just the user scripts running.  For this, the covert system monitor was 
utilized to collect network data for a few hours and this was stored in the baseline data directory. 
 
The covert channel system was then started to monitor the network for one hour.  Once the hour 
was complete, it was started as though it were the next week and it was starting its data 
exfiltration phase.  The system was run multiple times, decreasing the number of channels used 
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each time to see how the system reacted to the change.  The traffic it was tested on was kept the 
same as the baseline traffic. 
6.2 Data	  Throughput	  
The testing of the covert channel system was successful. The monitor yielded the results shown 
in Table 1 and  
Table 2. Tests started with the system running all channels. For each consecutive test, a channel 
was removed so one less protocol was in use to observe the change. The more channels in use, 
the higher throughput was observed as shown in Figure 4. Since the throughput is determined by 
the standard deviations of the channels, there would be a balance of increased t-values from 
usage being above and below the mean baseline proportions. 
Table 1: Monitored ingress traffic 
	  
Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	  
SSH	   31.10%	   1.86%	  
SMTP	   11.40%	   0.81%	  
FTP	   1.99%	   0.27%	  
HTTP	   43.83%	   4.02%	  
POP	   11.68%	   1.45%	  
Total(Packets)	   43351	   5991	  
 
Table 2: Monitored egress traffic 
	  
Mean	   Std.	  Dev.	  
SSH	   30.69	  %	   1.78%	  
SMTP	   11.51%	   0.86%	  
FTP	   2.02%	   0.28%	  
HTTP	   44.04%	   3.96%	  
POP	   11.73%	   1.50%	  
Total(Packets)	   43250	   5940	  
 
Based on Figure 4, the greater number of channels being used, the greater throughput is 
achieved.  When five covert channels were in use, 938 bytes of data were sent over the course of 
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the hour.  Four channels only dropped throughput slightly to 934 bytes in the hour.  The greatest 
change in throughput was observed when the number of channels dropped from three to two.  
When the system was down to one channel, 232 bytes were sent, a 4x decrease from when all 
present protocols had a working channel. 
 
Figure 4: Total throughput from covert channels as channels are removed. 
6.3 Channel	  Blocking	  
The system handled a blocked channel mid transport. Under this condition, the network stayed 
under the significance level. If one channel was blocked and the rest continued on for the rest of 
the time block it could cause a significance trigger. Since it dropped all the channels, the levels 
were able to stay under control.  
6.4 Staying	  Under	  Significance	  Levels	  
The channel was determined to be successful if for all the channels a level of significance was 
not reached. When all the channels were used, the levels of significance stayed close to 0. As 
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channels were removed, the levels increased. There was not a noticeable pattern of how the t-
values fluctuated since the network usage was also in flux.  
 
Below are the statistics gathered from the network while the system was running.  Table 3 and  
Table 4 show the traffic that was collected during the system and what the baseline was.  The 
amount of data for all the protocols were increased relative to its monitored proportion.  This 
caused a much greater increase for some protocols. 
Table 3: Ingress traffic of running system 
	  
Baseline	   System	  
Percent	  
Increase	  
FTP	   861	   965	   12.03%	  
HTTP	   19000	   21739	   14.42%	  
POP	   5065	   5947	   17.41%	  
SMTP	   4941	   5799	   17.38%	  
SSH	   13484	   14667	   8.78%	  
Total	   43351	   49117	   13.30%	  
 
Table 4: Egress traffic of running system 
	  
Baseline	   System	  
Percent	  
Increase	  
FTP	   874	   994	   13.79%	  
HTTP	   19049	   21469	   12.71%	  
POP	   5075	   5961	   17.47%	  
SMTP	   4979	   5681	   14.10%	  
SSH	   13274	   15012	   13.09%	  
Total	   43250	   49117	   13.57%	  
 
The proportions of traffic are displayed below in Figure 5 and Figure 6.  As it can be seen, the 
proportions of network traffic are relatively similar even though the total traffic increased by 
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5766 packets for ingress and 5867 packets for egress.  Since all the protocols increased together, 
the additional traffic helped mask the existence of the covert channel system. 
 
Figure 5: Comparison of protocol proportions of ingress traffic  
 
Figure 6: Comparison of protocol proportions of egress traffic 
    
As can be seen above, proportions remained largely similar between the baseline and the system 
executing.  There is some variability due to the network being variable and the full amount of 
available ingress/egress traffic will not get utilized.  Individual increases are significant, but 
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when viewed in the frame of all network traffic increasing, increases are small and insignificant.  
For example, ingress HTTP traffic increased from 19,000 packets per hour to 21,739 packets per 
hour.  Even though this is a 2,739 packet increase, which by itself is a 14% increase, only 
increased its utility by 1.46% in the total traffic proportions.  All channels had similar behavior 
of large individual increases, but insignificant increases when viewed in the whole system. 
6.5 Changes	  in	  Throughput	  
The affect of standard deviation was tested by artificially increasing the standard deviation of 
each protocol and observing the behavior.  As the standard deviation increases, the available 
throughput increased as well. This was due to a higher amount of change available before the 
level of significance was reached. As shown in Figure 7 and Figure 8 there was a positive linear 
correlation of channel throughput.  
 
 
Figure 7: Total throughput from covert channels as standard deviation increases. 
Figure 7 shows the effect of the change of standard deviation on the total system while Figure 8 
shows the effect of the change of standard deviation on the individual channels.  As it can be 
0	  
500	  
1000	  
1500	  
2000	  
2500	  
3000	  
3500	  
4000	  
1x	   2x	   3x	   4x	  
To
ta
l	  T
hr
ou
gh
pu
t	  (
By
te
s)
	  
Increase	  in	  Standard	  Devia^on	  
 
Christopher Hoffman  29 
seen, there is a direct relation between standard deviation and throughput.  For HTTP traffic, the 
base standard deviation allowed for 517 bytes.  An increase to 2x standard deviation yielded a 
1035 byte throughput, 3x was 1553 bytes, and 4x was 2071 bytes.  Based on this evidence, the 
greatest throughput will be achieved when there is greater standard deviation and is not affected 
by the mean amount of traffic. 
 
Figure 8: Traffic per protocol as standard deviation is increased 
7 Channel	  Analysis	  
7.1 Throughput	  
Throughput of the system was variable based on the collected network statistics. The more 
variable the baseline of the network was, the higher the throughput of the total system; this is due 
to the t-test calculation being based off standard deviation. 
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Having more channels will also increase the throughput of the covert channel system. The 
greatest throughput will occur when there is a covert channel for each protocol present in the 
network. If there is a protocol that does not have a covert channel, it will restrict the amount of 
traffic that can be added.  
7.2 Robustness	  
Robustness mechanisms are built into the system to keep it running. If a channel is blocked 
during one iteration (hour), it will not be used later. For that hour, the data will be discarded 
because it is unknown where the error took place so the data is unreliable. The channel system 
would also stop transmitting for the remainder of the timed window to help insure the traffic 
remains within acceptable levels.  Each hour will be able to start new, taking into account any 
previous issues. 
 
As discussed by Jadhav and Kattimani (Jadhav & Kattimani, 2011), hybrid channels are more 
robust as they are harder to detect.  Even though there are more pieces to detect, this covert 
channel system had the ability to recover from error and it would not mean an end to the system. 
7.3 Detection	  
Detection of the system is directly related to the covertness of the channels the system is using. 
Since the broad spectrum approach would use channels that are already optimized for covertness, 
this system should be as secure as the covert channels used.  
 
If a channel is found, the end points will be known since the system will use generated traffic as 
opposed to using hijacking traffic for message transfer. This will break the channel on the 
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internal side since the host will be cleaned. The owner of the external system will be able to 
remain more anonymous by running the controller in a public cloud with false credentials.  
7.4 Prevention	  
Preventing the covert channel system would be dependent on the prevention mechanisms of the 
individual channels. Millen (Millen, 1999) discussed that the best prevention mechanism would 
be to rebuild the affected system with the covert channel in mind.  In this case, prevention would 
be very difficult as this covert channel system affects many systems.  However, it would be 
possible to develop a detection mechanism to determine if a more in depth analysis is needed to 
find a covert channel.  This fits with Zander et. al. (Zander, Armitage, & Branch, 2007) that says 
if a covert channel cannot be removed, knowledge of its existence should still be audited to track 
its behavior. 
 
A possible detection mechanism could be to add artificial traffic on the network, this would 
involve adding a finite amount of traffic to the network using a protocol that is not naturally 
present. If the amount of that protocol traffic deviates from the standard, it can be determined 
that malicious behavior is taking place. 
8 Future	  Work	  
At the moment, the covert channel system is only for data exfiltration. It can be used for data 
infiltration as well at which point it could be a command/control channel for an attack pivot. This 
would create a powerful tool to pivot inside a network. 
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Another addition for future work is to pair the monitor with the sending system more closely.  
This way, when the system is transmitting, the monitor can determine if the base usage statistics 
have changed from week to week.  This will create a more robust system that will require less 
attention over time. 
 
A process to add channels over time would also be a good addition.  This way, as the attacker 
produces more covert channels they can be loaded dynamically instead of needing to replace the 
system. 
 
Data transmission can also be dispersed between internal hosts.  This could be done either by 
giving a different covert channel to multiple clients, or by breaking up the traffic for each 
channel to multiple clients in an attempt to not trigger a host based IDS.  The data can also be 
sent to multiple hosts outside to not stand out in a connection tracer. 
9 Conclusion	  
This paper has shown that by using a dynamic, broad spectrum approach, it is possible to 
increase the bandwidth of covert communication while maintaining acceptable covertness by 
running multiple covert channels side by side. The most bandwidth was observed when there 
were larger standard deviations and more channels in use. By monitoring the network before use, 
the system was able to make better decisions on the channels and amount of data to send. 
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A. Appendix	  
 
 
Channel Selector 
for each ingress[egress] 
  reverse t-test to find amount of traffic that can be added 
  ingress[egress]AdditionalTraffic 
  decrease additional by 10% to help protect the system 
 
Label A: 
  for each protocol P from the monitor 
    ratio=ingressAdditionalTraffic*P.ingressProportion/ 
P.egressAdditionalTraffic*egressProportion 
    select channel from preloaded bank that has closest ratio 
     
  for each channel 
    test ingress[egress] with t-test for significance 
    if significant, decrease additional traffic by 5% and restarted from Label A 
Message Ordering 
sort channels based number of transactions 
for channel[0].transactions 
  add channel ID to messageOrdering 
for each remaining channel c 
  index=0 
  for i=0 ; i<c.transactions 
    insert ID at index of messageOrdering 
    index= index+2 mod messageOrdering.length 
Figure A-2: Pseudocode for channel selection process 
Figure A-1: Pseudocode for message ordering 
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Internal Controller Processing 
Label A: 
sort channels by amount of data to send 
largest gets selected as feedback thread 
 
if the feedback fails 
  block channel restart at Label A 
 
initialize channel threads 
 
wait until x:05 
 
start channel threads 
 
sleep until x:55 
  check for problems  
  if problem occurs 
    close all channels 
 
ping the external controller to check for transfer problems 
if return good 
  update message index 
if return bad 
  block channels that had problems 
Figure A-3: Pseudocode for internal controller 
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External Controller Processing 
start all available channels 
listen for channel information to be sent 
 
initialize channel threads using the information sent 
start channels threads 
 
listen until x:55 for all the data to be sent 
 
collect information from the threads and close the channels 
 
if the appropriate amount of traffic has been sent 
  reassemble the message 
else 
  create message for the channels to send back 
Channel Controller 
receive message to send from controller 
create channel based on the channel name as the class 
on start: 
  sleepTime = (time until x:55) / (number of transaction) 
  for each transaction 
    extract the number of bytes the channel sends from its message 
    run the channel 
    sleep for sleepTime 
  
optional: 
 check for success 
 
on error: 
  close the socket 
Figure A-4: Pseudocode for channel controller 
Figure A-5: Pseudocode for external controller 
